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Peripherality and the Impact of SME Takeovers 
 
Abstract 
New Economic Geography models typically predict centripetal economic development. One 
process by which this might be brought about is if large companies based in the core of the 
economy buy up and remove small dynamic enterprises from peripheral regions, thereby 
suppressing development outside the core. This hypothesis is investigated by analysing the very 
large UK administrative firm-level Business Structure Database. Contrary to the experience of 
big firms, more productive small businesses are more subject to takeover - although this effect is 
weaker if they are located in peripheral regions than in the core. Takeovers also increase the 
chances of a small and medium size enterprise (SME) closing, but the exit consequence is greater 
for the core region. Takeovers raise productivity after acquisition in all regions but by less for the 
most productive SMEs. Ignoring any productivity gains to acquiring firms, the positive impact in 
the core region during the years considered is slightly larger than in the periphery, principally 
because takeovers are more common in the core. As this impact is a contributor to regional 
divergence, policy should aim to improve the operation of the market for SMEs in the periphery. 
 
 
JEL Classification L23, D21, R11 
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Peripherality and the Impact of SME Takeovers 
Businesses are less productive in peripheral regions than in the ‘core’. Explicitly or implicitly 
this is a key element of New Economic Geography models, even though typically they are 
formulated for higher levels of economic abstraction than the firm (for example Krugman 1991b; 
Krugman and Venables 1995). The divergence in productivity between regions is even greater 
for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) which account for a large proportion of national 
output, (e.g. Foreman-Peck et al. 2006 tables 1 and 2). One possible reason for such spatial 
differences in SME productivity is the operation of the market for control, or takeovers, of 
‘second hand’ firms; innovative and  faster-growing SMEs are the most likely to attract bids 
(Cosh and Hughes, 2003). Since productivity is raised by entry and expansion of more 
productive firms and the exit of the less productive (Disney, Haskel and Heden 2003), the 
‘culling’ of the more productive SMEs in the periphery could be behind regional divergences 
(Mason and Harrison 2006). This paper therefore investigates the contribution that SME 
takeovers may make to spatial variations in productivity.  
 
Start-up firms, that can be the seedcorn of economic development, may become targets for large 
firms unable to generate organic growth scouring markets for such enterprises with ideas and 
products that will maintain their growth rates (Baumol 2004). Smith & Nephew, currently a 
FTSE 100 company, traditionally known for growth by acquisition of products such as Nivea, 
Dove soap, intraocular lenses, and hip replacements, is a case in point (Foreman-Peck 1995, pp. 
136-7 pp. 212-3). Alternatively big companies may provide the finance for R&D by start-ups in 
the hope that they will produce innovations that can be absorbed in due course, as with 
pharmaceutical giants and the biotech industry (Allansdottir, et al. 2002). Integrating these 
companies with the acquirer might well lead to closures of the original plant or research 
functions. An example is Molecular Light Technology, a Cardiff University spin out formed in 
1991 and employing 41 people, having registered 15 patents and published over 80 research 
papers. In 2003 the business was bought by the largest customer, the US firm Gen-Probe, which 
invested £2.9m with a view to doubling turnover to £9m over 5 years (Molecular Light 
Technology 2008; PRNewswire 2003). Then Gen-Probe transferred the research function to 
California, leaving only production in Cardiff.  
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On the other hand, the net effect of SME takeovers for peripheral regions might be entirely 
beneficial, as could be concluded by analogy with the Allinson et al. (2007) study of the SME 
‘transfer market’. Allinson et al (2007) focussed on simple SME ownership change, not on 
mergers or takeovers, but concluded that there was evidence of market failure particularly 
stemming from inadequately qualified intermediaries and absence of due diligence. Alleviating 
the ‘business succession’ problem has also exercised EC policy makers (European Commission 
2006). Were these shortcomings of the market rectified there would be more successful trades 
and an improvement in well being. As the present paper will demonstrate, this remains a 
possibility for SME takeovers as well.  
 
The problem then is the regional effect of the acquisition of SMEs. The contribution of the paper 
is to test an overarching  hypothesis about the regional impact of SME and to estimate the size of 
the effect.  
 
 The takeover impact on regional productivity growth is divided into three components: (1) the 
impact of productivity on the probability of being taken over, (2) the effect of a takeover on the 
probability of exit of the target firm and (3) the effect of takeover on the productivity growth of 
the target firm. Section 1 surveys the literature and extracts some hypotheses relating to these 
three elements, section 2 explains the strengths and limitations of the new data set that permits 
this topic to be investigated, section 3 outlines the model and derives an expression for the 
quantitative impact of takeovers on the periphery, section 4 discusses the estimation of the 
model, and section 5 expounds the results of the analysis. A concluding section suggests some 
caveats. 
 
1. Previous Research 
The regional impact of SME takeovers depends upon the reasons for SME acquisitions, their 
effects and the spatial features of these two elements. Most research on mergers and acquisitions 
implicitly or explicitly tends to consider larger, listed firms (Caves 1989). Q theory is a recent 
example (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002), while much theoretical literature has focussed on the 
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consequences of takeovers for market structure and behaviour
1
. Large firm empirical research on 
takeovers often uses event studies of stock returns to assess their effects (for example Martynova 
and Renneboog 2011). This literature is not relevant to present concerns because almost all 
SMEs are not publicly quoted. Moreover their small size means that impacts of both horizontal 
and vertical takeovers on competition are likely to be much less significant than in the case of 
publicly quoted enterprises. 
 
More central is the growing literature that views mergers and acquisitions (M & As) as a means 
of transferring and obtaining new technology, or assets, such as management (Ahuja and Katila 
2001; Cassiman, Colombo,  Garrone and Veugelers, 2005; Cloodt, Hagedoorn, and Van 
Kranenburg 2006; Colombo, Grilli, and Piva, 2006; Hussinger 2010; Lehto and Lehtoranta 
2004). Firms can accumulate critical knowledge assets either by internal investment or 
externally, such as by buying another enterprise (Hall 1988). Acquisitions may then serve as a 
substitute for in-house innovation and R&D; Dessyllas and Hughes (2005) find high technology 
targets likely to have a greater stock of patents and high accumulated R&D. More inventive 
capabilities of SMEs, relative to larger firms, increase their chances of becoming attractive 
targets (Alvarez and Barney 2001). Consistent with the search for intangible knowledge assets, 
empirical evidence suggests that innovative, fast-growing businesses are more likely to be bid 
targets (Cosh and Hughes, 2003; Mason and Harrison 2006). For small privately owned firms, 
patents raise the probability of foreign M&A (Ali-Yrkkö, Hyytinen, and Pajarinen 2005). Most 
technology-intensive SMEs in Sweden have eventually been acquired, and in most of the 
European regions surveyed these types of firms are bought by external multinationals 
(Dahlstrand 2000, pp. 174-6). Targets with these characteristics are likely to be highly 
productive, in contrast, for example, to the predictions of Q theory for large firms. A source of 
high productivity of interest to acquirers includes the knowledge assets, patents. In short, when 
larger firms are looking for acquisitions to offset their inadequate internally generated innovation 
                                                 
1
 Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) is a canonical reference for horizontal acquisitions in this context and 
Greenhut and Ohta (1976) for vertical acquisitions. This last formulation is not of great relevance for SMEs because 
it postulates that the upstream producer has market power but the downstream producer exercises no monopsony, 
concluding that a merger of the stages raises output, lowers price and increase profits. Vertical M&As involving 
SMEs may provide a useful way for larger companies to reduce their costs or enhance their innovation capacity, but 
in these cases the upstream firm is unlikely to have market power, certainly relative to the downstream business. 
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or management skills, they create a demand for the more productive and innovative SMEs. 
Hence we derive the hypothesis;  
H1. More productive SMEs are more likely to be taken over 
 
The degree of technological relatedness of buyer and seller is especially important for the 
acquisitions of SMEs (Hussinger 2010). In a two game, quantity setting model where firms first 
compete on R&D and then on quantity in the product market, Davidson and Ferrett (2007) show 
the greater the R&D complementarities between the enterprises, the more profitable will be the 
acquisition. Acquirers ‘inside’ the technology or product market of the target are likely to be 
more aware of the (potential) value of a target (Capron and Shen 2007; Shen and Reuer 2005), 
especially SMEs (Howells 1990). Thereby they can overcome the typical lack of relevant public 
information. However, moderate levels of relatedness turn out to be optimum (Ahuja and Katila 
2001; Cloodt et al. 2006).  
 
High productivity (relative to the industry) is likely to be reflected in profits. Small but profitable 
companies are usually found to be takeover targets (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987b, 1989). The 
smaller the firm targeted, the more profitable it is relative to its industry. A study of both 
privately and publicly traded firms found that acquired businesses were more profitable than 
their industry average (Matsusaka 1993). Private firm targets are more profitable than their 
public counterparts, even accounting for size differences. Acquirers of private firms therefore 
perform better than if they purchase a public one (Capron and Shen 2007). The market and the 
publicly available information for a private firm are likely to be thinner than for a publicly 
quoted enterprise. Hence SME prices will be discounted, to the benefit of the buyer. Information 
about an SME is likely to be a function of whether it is public or private (because of different 
reporting requirements) and of age and size. The performance of private companies, the very 
young and small will be relatively less known to potential acquirers, so they are less likely to be 
targets.  
H2. Takeover chances increase with  information. 
 
Turning to spatial dimensions of takeovers, acquisitions are likely to involve targets close to the 
acquirer’s headquarters. This is particularly so in the largest metropolitan areas, or at locations 
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with a high density of firms, where M&A activity declines with distance (Green 1990; Green and 
Cromley 1984; Rodriguez-Pose and Zademach 2003). High technology SMEs can be a means of 
allowing external buyers (external to the market, the region, or the country) to access indigenous 
knowledge, and perhaps remove it. Intra-nationally firms from the most prosperous areas 
conduct a disproportionate number of acquisitions but targets are much less regionally 
concentrated (Böckerman and Lehto 2006; Leigh and North 1978). The propensity to conduct 
extra- or intra-regional acquisitions is linked to the acquirer’s size and the target’s profit or 
productivity potential. Small acquirers are more probably within the region, consolidating their 
existing positions, whereas larger predators may well be from outside. Larger companies, that 
may have better access to financial resources, are more able to target smaller unquoted firms in 
more distant locations (Ashcroft and Love 1992). The size of the acquirer also affects the 
required attributes of potential targets. Leigh and North (1978) find regions with large companies 
seek efficient, small firms to help future expansion. Purchases further afield similarly target well 
performing (profitable) businesses and those with fixed assets- that can be made to perform 
(Böckerman and Lehto 2006). Foreign suitors commonly buy more productive plants or firms 
(Griffith et al.2004; Hanley and Zervos 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002; Salis 2008). 
Agglomeration triggers more intense local competition as well as better information flows in 
core regions and therefore a stronger demand to acquire SMEs than in the periphery. Poor 
information (here is the relevance of H2) is likely to ensure that  predators  only notice the most 
obvious periphery-based targets. . Hence  
H3: The effect specified in H1 is stronger in peripheral regions (than in core regions) 
 
After takeover the integration of the target with the buyer’s enterprise may involve closure at the 
original location, or restriction of activities (cessation of R&D for instance), or a deterioration or 
an improvement of performance. The effect of takeover is likely to depend on the original 
purpose. If the intention is to obtain new or better market access, then the target will probably 
have an increased chance of survival, perhaps even benefiting from the resources of the acquirer. 
Even with such a motivation for takeover, new foreign or external owners may be more alien to 
local market conditions. This can increase the likelihood of ‘bedding-in’ problems, relative to 
domestic or local acquisitions. Alternatively, the external firm may value the assets more highly 
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than potential local acquirers; outside owners might be better placed to divest the firm of assets 
by breaking employment contracts and removing productive capacity (Chapman 2003). 
 
Knowledge transfer motivation can explain why for the successful integration of an acquisition it 
may be necessary to relocate the target firm assets close to the acquirer; high returns require 
direct physical or economic contact (Wesson 1999, p. 2). In faster growing, technology-intensive 
industries, takeovers result in the exit of plants peripheral to the main enterprise (Chapman and 
Edmond 2000). Again consistent with targeting intangible knowledge assets is evidence that 
plants acquired by the foreign-owned firms have a much higher chance of subsequent exit 
(Harris and Hassaszadeh 2002). Smaller targets with their intangible assets could be of more 
benefit than the rationalisation and improved performance of larger targets (Piscitello and 
Rabbiosi 2005); relatively smaller targets have been found to increase the post-acquisition 
performance of the acquirer (Ahuja and Katila 2001). Takeovers are an investment decision, an 
element of which might be relocation or closure to take advantage of synergies with the 
acquiring firm’s assets. Where this is the case, takeovers increase the chances of SME exit. A 
caveat concerns the case when SME inputs, such as capital, are rationed or otherwise unusually 
constrained (due to their high costs relative to those of larger firms). In this situation, acquisition 
may reduce chances of exit by resulting in injections of capital or other support. However, in line 
with specifying an overarching hypothesis favouring harm to the periphery, we postulate; 
H4.Takeovers  increase the chances of SME exit. 
 
Acquiring firms are more probably located in core regions of the economy, where more company 
headquarters are based. Complementarities between the buyer and the target that can or must be 
exploited by proximity may precipitate closure of the acquisition at the original location. Then 
after a takeover, acquired SMEs in the periphery are more likely to be closed to take advantage 
of their knowledge or other asset in the core. 
H5. The effect specified in H4 is stronger in peripheral regions. 
 
Some studies of foreign (and therefore extra-regional) acquisitions establish that they can cause a 
fall in the productivity of the target (Hanley and Zervos 2007; Harris and Robinson 2002), no 
improvement (Salis 2008), or improvements in productivity only a few years after purchase 
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(Karpaty 2007). This last would be observed in the presence of ‘bedding-in’ problems and 
adjustment costs of acquisition. Other evidence of foreign acquisitions shows mostly positive 
effects on productivity or growth (Bertrand and Zitouna 2007; Conyon, Girma, Thompson and 
Wright 2002; Girma and Görg 2007; Griffith et al. 2004; Piscitello and Rabbiosi 2005). Indeed, 
some studies find that the targets improve relative to domestic acquisitions (Bertrand and 
Zitouna 2007; Conyon et al. 2002) and even more if initial productivity is lower (Girma and 
Görg 2007). Takeovers may provide new resources that aid small firms in improving their 
productivity and expanding their size. Alternatively, acquisitions may strip SMEs of their 
dynamism and lower performance when subject to integration problems and other adjustment 
costs of acquisition.  
H6. Takeover may increase or reduce target SME productivity in general. 
 
But if predators are searching for intangible knowledge assets that they have been unable to build 
up themselves, when they do make a high productivity acquisition it is quite plausible that they 
will have an adverse impact on the target if it stays in business. A transfer of the knowledge 
assets such as R&D to the headquarters, as in the case of Molecular Light Technology in the 
introduction, could have this effect.  In this case, the more productive acquired firms lose what 
ultimately made them high performers, triggering a decline in productivity. 
H7. Takeover reduces the productivity of the target SME at the top of the productivity range 
 
Takeovers may contribute to the concentration of economic activity that is a feature of New 
Economic Geography models (Krugman 1991b; Krugman and Venables 1995). They can 
reinforce core-periphery divergence (Brouwer, Mariotti, and van Ommeren 2004) and weaken 
peripheral locations (Ashcroft and Love 1993), with external takeovers concentrating economic 
activity within core regions (Holl 2004; Rodriguez-Pose and Zademach 2003). If the birth and 
indigenous growth rate of high technology SMEs is insufficient to match the rate of acquisition 
and absorption by extra-regional enterprise, the centripetal tendency predicted by the New 
Economic Geography (NEG) will be reinforced. Corporate control will converge on the core 
regions (Ashcroft, Coppins and Raeside 1994). Control of small firms from peripheral areas 
shifts to large firms based in core areas where the financial centres are located (Chapman and 
Edmond 2000).  On the other hand, it is theoretically possible in an NEG model that institutions 
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and policies lower the costs of information sufficiently to encourage dispersion of economic 
activity (Baldwin and Forskild 2000). Without the information coat reduction,  a possible 
negative productivity effect of takeovers is more pronounced for SMEs located in the periphery 
as the new owners move resources, assets or expertise into the core where there principal 
enterprises are located. 
H8. The effect described in H7 is stronger in the peripheral regions. 
 
To summarise, SME takeover targets (unlike conventional transfers or mergers) are more likely 
to be high productivity high profit companies, in contrast to stock market listed targets. Large 
firms more probably take over SMEs further afield and raising the chances that the acquirer will 
be based outside the periphery. Large established firms’ desire to acquire intangible knowledge 
assets may be a key motive. If so, after takeover, target SMEs may: close, lose their intangible 
assets, or relocate. In fact the evidence available to date is mixed as to whether any of these 
options occurs, or instead productivity rises as a consequence of new resource injections, or on 
the other hand, ‘bedding in’ problems drag down productivity for an initial period. So too then 
are the consequences are uncertain for regional or core-periphery development consequent upon 
takeovers. Indigenous growth potential may be enhanced or reduced and core-periphery gaps 
widened or narrowed. 
 
2. Data, definitions and description 
For the UK the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) and Business Structure Database (BSD) 
uniquely allow the identification of SME takeovers. The BSD is a version of the IDBR, which 
covers 98 percent of economic activity in the UK for each year, and contains around 2 million 
observations that include all but the very smallest of firms (Barnes and Martin 2002). It is a 
representative data set of nearly the entire population of UK firms, not a sample survey
2
. The 
size of the data set is particularly helpful for the study of takeovers which, unlike business 
                                                 
2
 But the data set will not include the smallest businesses according to both employment and turnover (and some 
non-profit organisations). The IDBR’s coverage is limited by voluntary registration for firms below the VAT 
registration threshold and the exclusion of employers whose employees are below the income tax threshold. 
Businesses with a turnover above the threshold are not required to register if they trade exclusively in exempt goods. 
If both the criteria concerning VAT and PAYE (‘Pay as you earn’ for income tax) are not met then firms are 
excluded from the Register (ONS 2007). It is possible companies can come in and out of the register between years 
if they do not meet the above criteria between years. 
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succession, are comparatively rare events. By excluding all cases where employment is greater 
than 249, the data set is restricted to SMEs
3
. 
 
The trade-off for the broad coverage is that the data set contains very few variables, namely: 
Address, Industry classification (industrial/economic activity), Employment, Turnover, Legal 
Status (company, sole proprietor, partnership, public corporation/nationalised body, local 
authority or non-profit body) and Enterprise Group links. Two data merging operations for the 
BSD are necessary. The first is with the National Postcode Directory to be able to assign 
enterprises to regions. The second involves merging successive years of the BSD using the 
unique enterprise identifier. 
 
The level of analysis is the enterprise, defined as: 
‘the smallest combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which 
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making...’(ONS 2006, p. 7).  
As all ownership changes apply to the enterprise group level, it is still possible to identify firms 
that have been subject to these changes at the enterprise level. In the present analysis of the three 
ownership changes simple succession, merger and takeover, only the third category – ‘takeover’- 
is employed. This definition implies that the SME is the target and the likelihood is that it is 
acquired by a firm larger than itself; hence the continuation of the acquiring enterprise’s identity. 
When an SME is taken over, in the BSD the ownership reference number changes (for the 
acquired) but not the enterprise reference number. The latter is used to track the enterprise over 
time, the former is used to identify ownership details. As the takeover marker is for acquired firm 
unfortunately it is not possible to trace the acquirer.   
 
In the BSD an important distinction is made between types of transfer
4
. For takeovers, the 
definition is chosen from three categories of ownership change  (ONS 2006)
5
. These are: 
                                                 
3
 Turnover must also be positive for inclusion in the sample. 
4
 These terminological distinctions matter to understand the relationship with a related strand of SME research, 
entrepreneurial entry. Unlike the present paper, here the term ‘takeover’ is employed to mean acquisition and so 
could cover any of the three categories above. Parker and Van Praag (2010) focus on the determinants of the choice 
between starting a new business or acquiring an existing enterprise for a sample of Dutch individuals who have 
either acquired a firm (from a family or non-family member) or started a completely new firm. Block, Thurik and 
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1) a ‘pure’ change of ownership such as when an owner manager retires, selling the business to a 
successor,  
2) a ‘merger’, when for instance two enterprises integrate entirely and lose their identities, and  
3) a ‘takeover’  when two enterprises integrate entirely, but one enterprise retains their identity, 
by which  is meant ‘controls the combined operation’. Takeovers are comparatively rare for 
SMEs, and hence the advantage of the very large data set of almost two million SMEs employed 
in the present paper. This ownership change is also the most likely form that SME asset 
acquisition by large extra-regional firms would take.  
 
The BSD imposes the requirement of using turnover as the output measure
6
. McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995, p. 262) maintain that at the firm level gross output will vary with the theoretical 
output. In the absence of firm level price deflators, turnover change must be assumed to reflect 
output change. Estimates of capital stock are inadequate for use with the SME sector. This 
precludes estimating total factor productivity (TFP) and requires a focus on labour productivity 
(LP). However, both because of differences in the capital stock and bought in materials, the level 
of LP varies markedly between sectors (eg Griffith et al. 2004, p. 445) . To allow comparisons 
across different industrial sectors
7
, the approach adopted is therefore to estimate each SME’s 
productivity relative to the industry mean. This method removes industry-specific factors to 
create ‘relative labour productivity’ (RLP) (Griffith et al. 2004). 
 
Following McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) RLP normalises labour productivity across industries. 
A figure greater than one indicates greater than the industry average productivity and a value of 
less than unity  shows productivity less than the industry average;  
 
RLPij = LPij / ALPj 
Where i is each firm and j is each industry, LP is labour productivity, ALP is average labour 
productivity. Industries are defined at the 3-digit level of the UK SIC 1992 classification. To 
                                                                                                                                                             
van der Zwan (2010) conduct a cross national analysis of preferences for the same choice (if the respondent had the 
means would they prefer to acquire an existing business or to start a new one?).  
5
 ONS follow the guidance provided by Eurostat (2003). 
6
 For research firms perhaps generating patents but  no current revenue this measure will be inadequate. 
7
 The problems of doing so have been documented by Baumol and Wolff (1984). 
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improve the robustness of observations within each industry, small industries are removed. 
Industries with less than 50 cases, measured at the 3 digit SIC 92 level, are omitted
8
. This helps 
to ensure that a single firm’s LP is not overly influential within the industry average. To 
maximise observations within each industry, the estimates of productivity include SMEs located 
in Northern Ireland but the analysis does not.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Regions are categorised according to their Gross Value Added (GVA) per head, per worker or 
per hour worked. All three criteria provide the same ranking of UK regions in 2004. The 
allocation of regions to the categories of core, periphery and intermediate regions
9
 is shown in 
Table 1. One third of SMEs were based in the regional core of London and the South East. One 
quarter of SMEs were located in the periphery of Wales, the North East, Yorkshire and the North 
West.  
Table 1 - SME Location 
Location (2004) N % 
Periphery 467,893 24.7% 
Wales 85,661 4.5% 
N. East 50,117 2.6% 
York. & Hum. 140,990 7.4% 
N. West 191,125 10.1% 
Intermediate 807,875 42.6% 
W. Mid. 160,339 8.5% 
E. Mid. 134,121 7.1% 
S. West 185,228 9.8% 
Scot. 131,365 6.9% 
E. Eng. 196,822 10.4% 
Core 621,520 32.8% 
S. East 324,909 17.1% 
London 296,611 15.6% 
Total 1,897,288 100% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations 
Note. Core-periphery definition based on GVA per hour worked or per filled job or per head 
 
                                                 
8
 There are about 15 of these, amounting to perhaps 200 observations, not many considering the size of the sample 
(around 0.01%). 
9
 The intermediate regions are very heterogeneous, including the second largest UK conurbation. 
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London experienced the highest proportion of SME exits in 2006 and Wales the lowest (Table 2) 
- which ensures the core has a higher exit rate than the periphery - but otherwise there is no clear 
pattern between regions. The most productive quartile of SMEs are most likely to be taken over 
in 2005 (Table 3). SMEs in the periphery are least likely to be taken over in 2005 while those in 
the core have the greatest chance of being acquired (Table 4).    
Table 2 - SME exit frequencies by region 
Region (2004) 
Total 
(2004) 
Exit 
(2006) 
 % exiting 
(2006) 
Wales 85,661 17,565 20.5% 
N. East 50,117 11,909 23.8% 
York. & Hum. 140,990 31,966 22.7% 
N. West 191,125 44,542 23.3% 
W. Mid. 160,339 35,720 22.3% 
E. Mid. 134,121 30,375 22.6% 
S. West 185,228 40,147 21.7% 
Scot. 131,365 29,474 22.4% 
E. Eng. 196,822 43,647 22.2% 
S. East 324,909 75,874 23.4% 
London 296,611 78,296 26.4% 
Total 1,897,288 439,515 23.2% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations 
 
Table 3 – SME Takeover by Productivity  
Quartile of 
RLP 
Proportion of 
takeovers 
1
st
 quartile  0.63% 
2
nd
 quartile 0.54% 
3
rd
 quartile 0.55% 
4
th
 quartile 0.91% 
Total 0.66% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations 
Note: Sample size 1,897,288 
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Table 4 – SME Takeover by Location  
Location 2004 N 
Takeover 
freq. 
Takeover 
proportion 
Periphery 467,893 2,459 0.53% 
Wales 85,661 308 0.36% 
N. East 50,117 222 0.44% 
York. & Hum. 140,990 834 0.59% 
N. West 191,125 1,095 0.57% 
Intermediate 807,875 4,488 0.56% 
W. Mid. 160,339 974 0.61% 
E. Mid. 134,121 709 0.53% 
S. West 185,228 819 0.44% 
Scot. 131,365 741 0.56% 
E. Eng. 196,822 1,245 0.63% 
Core 621,520 5,557 0.89% 
S. East 324,909 2,174 0.67% 
London 296,611 3,383 1.14% 
Total 1,897,288 12,504 0.66% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations 
 
3. The  Model 
The present paper aims to test an extreme version of the hypothesis for the periphery impact of 
SME takeovers, because the benefits to the acquirer cannot be measured with the BSD data set. 
All acquirers of concern are assumed located in the core zone. Then the periphery will be harmed 
by takeovers if they reduce aggregate periphery productivity; this contribution to economic 
location is centripetal as in the earliest NEG models. The assumption gives an upward bias to the 
‘harm’ estimate if some acquirers benefit from the takeover and are based in the periphery. If the 
‘harm’ hypothesis can be rejected on the basis of this assumption it is certain that with more 
information, about acquirer benefits, it would be more strongly rejected.  
 
Three equations can be used to test the overarching hypothesis, (that takeovers damage periphery 
productivity), and estimate the effect of SME takeovers on the productivity of the periphery 
regions, on the assumption of extra-regional acquisition. Respectively they capture  (1) the effect 
of productivity on the probability of being taken over, (2) the  effect of a takeover on the 
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probability of exit of the target firm and (3) the effect of takeover on the productivity growth of 
the target firm. 
 
Where Pr is probability, T is takeover the t subscripts denote dates, ui are disturbance terms, φ is 
the link function, ‘location’=1 for periphery, otherwise zero, and i indexes firms, the takeover 
equation is: 
 
Pr(Tit=1) = φ( α1prodi t-1+ α2locationi t-1* prodi t-1 + α3 public informationi t-1 ) +  u1     (1) 
α1>0, α2 >0 , α3 >0 …… (H1-H3) 
 
Where X is exit, 
Pr(Xit+1= 1) = φ( β1 Ti t-1+ β2locationi t-1* Ti t-1) +  u2             (2) 
β1 ≶ 0,  β2 >0 ......(H4,H5) 
 
Where Prod is productivity, 
Ln Prodi t+1 =  γ1Ti t + γ2Ti t *locationi t-1,+  γ3Ti t * prodit-1 + u3   (3) 
γ1 ≶ 0, γ2 < 0, γ3 <0 ....(H6- H8) 
 
 Whether the acquisition targets subsequently improve in productivity relative to what they 
would have achieved, or whether they cease trading after takeover when they would not 
otherwise, could have an impact on regional economic development, and productivity 
differentials, harmful or beneficial. The effects interact with the process of selecting targets. Low 
productivity selection in equation 1 and closure in equation 2 would boost productivity. High 
productivity selection in equation 1 and closure could lower productivity. The overall effect 
depends also on the benefits of the takeover to the acquirer.  
 
The impact of SME takeovers on productivity in the periphery also depends upon the marginal 
effect of takeovers on productivity (Prod /T) and the probability of a firm being acquired 
Pr(T). If either of these vary by firm size, then it is not appropriate to multiply the average effect 
by the number of firms to obtain the aggregate result. The simple approach of ignoring size 
effects assumes the smallest SMEs have the same contribution to aggregate productivity as an 
16 
 
SME with 249 employees. If both the chances of takeover and its impact vary by size, then using 
the average figures ignores the possibility that large acquired SMEs disproportionately influence 
the total impact. 
 
To include the effects of firm size and takeover in the performance model (equation 3) equation 
4 posits that the productivity performance (prod) of firm i is affected by takeover (T), an 
interaction of takeover and employment (T.E) and other factors, some to be specified later; 
 
ln Prodi t+1 = γ1Ti t + γ2Ti t *locationi t-1,+  γ3Ti t * prodit-1   + γ4 Ti t.*Ei t-1 + u3  (4) 
 
If there is a size effect of takeovers for SMEs, γ4 ≠ 0, and γ1 will not capture the full effect of 
takeovers on productivity. This is; 
ln Prod / T = γ1 + γ4 Ei t-1 
 
To obtain the total impact, the marginal effect of takeovers on performance ln Prod / T) is 
estimated for every acquired SME, providing a predicted effect of acquisition on its 
performance. Then, both the chances of takeover and its effect must be weighted to reflect the 
fact that larger SMEs contribute more to the economy. In short, the aggregate effect of SME 
takeovers on periphery productivity is the individual firm’s chances of takeover multiplied by the 
productivity impact of takeovers, times the firm’s weight or contribution to aggregate 
productivity within the SME sector, summed across all firms indexed by i;   
Z1 = ∑ Pr(Tt)i .(Prod / T)it+1 .Wi t-1   (5) 
 where Wi t-1 is the SMEs’ share of periphery employment
10
, Ei t-1 / Ei t-1. 
 
Equation 5 measures only the direct impact of takeovers on productivity, assuming that all 
acquired SMEs survive. But an additional consideration is that SME exits after takeover may 
affect productivity. The aggregate effect of SME exits because of takeover depends upon the 
probability of takeover and the marginal effect of takeovers on the probability of exit. As with 
                                                 
10
 Appendix A explains why employment and not output weights are suitable. 
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the impact of takeover on performance, if size affects the probability of takeover or the takeover-
exit effect then it is not possible to estimate the aggregate effect from the sample means. Larger 
acquired SMEs have a greater impact on the aggregate than the average and the total effect must 
reflect their importance.  
 
The probability of takeover is the same as in (5) and the effect of takeovers on exit can be 
calculated from equation 2. This is analogous to the productivity equation above; the inclusion of 
takeover-size interactions can capture any possible size-varying effects (equation 6 below); 
 
Pr(Xit+1= 1) = φ( β1 Tit + β2locationi t-1* Ti t-1 +  3Tit.Eit-1 )+  u2      (6) 

Pr(X) / T = φ(1+ 3.Eit-1 )                                 (6a) 
From 6 and 6a it is apparent that the effect of takeovers on the probability of exit includes 3.Eit-1 
if exit chances vary by firm size (3 ≠ 0).  
 
The effect of takeover on exit also depends on the productivity of firms. If takeover-exits involve 
firms that are less productive than the average then their departure boosts the overall level of 
productivity. Therefore a measure of the impact of SME closures consequent upon takeover must 
include their productivity relative to the (weighted) average level of productivity. 
 
In summary, the effect of takeover-exits on periphery productivity is the product of  a periphery 
SME’s individual probability of takeover, the marginal effect of takeover on its probability of 
exit, the SME’s differential  productivity and its employment weight summed across all firms, 
or; Z2 = ∑ Pr(T)it .(Pr(X) / T)i t+1 .((Prodi t-1  - Prod t-1) / Prod t-1).Wi t-1  (7) 
 where Prod t-1 is the (weighted) average of productivity across all firms at time t-1. Any impact 
on the acquiring business is irrelevant to the periphery region because by assumption it occurs 
elsewhere. 
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Subtracting (7) from the productivity impact (5) of takeovers yields the total productivity effect, 
excluding any on acquirers
11
;  
Z3 = ∑[(Pr(T)it .(Prod / T)it+1 .Wit-1) – (Pr(T)it .(Pr(X)/T)it+1 .((Prodit-1  - Prod t-1) / Prod t-1).Wit-1)]           (8) 
 
 
(8) is a base weighted (Laspeyres) index and, if the market works well, may understate the 
impact of takeovers. Takeovers might enhance SME employment (but alternatively they may 
shed jobs) and more productive SMEs are likely to increase their market share (but again, 
takeovers can be mismanaged and market share lost).  
 
4. Estimation 
Unbiased estimates of the parameters needed to calculate the impact of takeovers require that the 
disturbance terms (ui) in the model, be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, if single 
equation estimation is used. If unobserved bad management or luck reduce the chances of 
takeover and increase the likelihood of exit, then  E(u1,u2)<0,  Single equation estimation of (2) 
requires that E(T,u2)=0. Failure to take into account the disturbance correlation of the exit and 
takeover equations means that T could be unduly low when X is high because of the disturbance 
term, so the effect of takeover on exit will be overestimated by single equation methods. 
Bivariate probit (or biprobit) estimation controls for T and u2 actually being negatively 
correlated. Potential endogeneity of takeover in the exit equation can be ignored in the bivariate 
probit estimation, in contrast to linear simultaneous equations (Greene 1998, p. 295). Bivariate 
probit estimation requires maximising the log-likelihood instead of using the sample moments. 
 
Higher productivity may be both a cause and an effect of takeover in equations (1) and (3), 
thereby correlating the disturbance terms and the explanatory variables.  Assuming both 
structural parameters are positive, the simultaneous relationship implies that takeovers will be 
high when u3 is large and that productivity will be high when u1 is large; E(T, u3) ≠ 0 and 
E(Prod, u1) ≠ 0.  An unobserved favourable shift in demand (large u1) might increase the chances 
of takeover and through equation (3) also improve productivity. But through equation 1 this 
higher productivity (Prod) may then be associated with the large u1.  
                                                 
11
 Takeover-relocation effects are ignored here because they are infrequent. 
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The difference-in-difference method, comparing productivity before and after takeover, treating 
enterprises not taken over as controls for those that are, goes some way to addressing this 
problem (Meyer 1995).  Where Prod1 is the productivity prior to acquisition of enterprises that 
are taken over, and Prod2 the productivity after takeover, Prod3 the productivity of non-acquired 
firms at the same time as Prod1 and Prod4 their productivity at the same time as Prod2, the 
‘average treatment effect’ is (Prod2 - Prod1) - (Prod4 - Prod3), the difference between the 
productivity increase of those taken over and those not. Enterprises with large (or small) ui 
before and after the takeover year would lose such effects by the differencing, by focusing on the 
increase in ‘Prod’ rather than the level.  
 
However, the appropriateness of the control depends on the absence of selection of the takeover 
target; enterprises taken over would not otherwise have increased their productivity by more than 
those not acquired. Some of those not acquired cease trading over the period considered for the 
productivity performance, and these are likely to have been the least productive. Some of the 
taken over firms were closed but not necessarily the least productive, if their assets when 
integrated provided a boost to the purchaser’s business. If firms that would have increased 
productivity by less tend to exit then survivors will be more productive regardless of whether or 
not they have been taken over. This selection process implies that E(u2,u3)>0. A Heckman (1979) 
estimation procedure is therefore combined with the difference-in-differences to control for the 
possible bias in equation 3 with, in effect, equation 2 as the selector
12
.  
 
To test the subsidiary hypotheses and estimate the parameters necessary to calculate the impact 
of SME takeovers on the periphery, control variables must be added to the takeover, exit and 
productivity equations. In the takeover equation, a squared productivity variable is included. 
Polynomials of ‘Employment’ up to the fourth degree capture the possibly non-linear effects of 
SME size on the chances of takeover. ‘Entity’ measures whether an SME is registered as a sole 
proprietor (omitted case), partnership or company. ‘Age’ in 2004 is a set of dummy variables. 49 
two digit ‘Industry’ controls from UK SIC 1992 are incorporated (though coefficients are not 
                                                 
12
 Actually the mirror image, survival, rather than exit. 
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reported). ‘Location’ identifies whether the SME is in the ‘core’ (omitted case), intermediate 
region or periphery of Great Britain. ‘Structure’ controls for SMEs that may have multiple local 
units and is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of local units. 
 
The estimating model of equation 1, takeovers, is then: 
Pr(Tt=1) = φ(α0 + α1RLPi t-1+ α2Locationi t-1*RLPi t-1 + α3agei t-1 + α4 Employmenti t-1 + α5Entityt-1 
+  α6Industryt-1 +  α7Locationt-1 + α8Employmentt-1 +  α9Structuret-1  +  α10ln(RLPt-1)
2
 + 
α11Employmentt-1 
2
 + α12Employmentt-1
3
 + α13Employmentt-1
4
 ) + u1                                                  ....(9) 
 
Hypothesis 1 is that the demand for SME control targets the more productive businesses (α1>0, 
but also depends upon α2 and α10). α2  (>0) tests whether high productivity firms in the periphery 
are more prone to takeover; this is hypothesis 3  which also depends on α7,α1 and α10. Hypothesis 
2 is that the market value of high productivity and innovative SMEs only becomes apparent 
when  there is good information about the firm. Because of official reporting requirements, better 
information is available for companies than for sole proprietorships (α5 >0. In addition when 
firms are larger and have accumulated a track record informational asymmetries are reduced, and 
therefore  the chances of takeover rise (α3 ,α4 >0, but the size effect also depends upon α12,α13 
and α14). 
 
The empirical exit equation, where X = exit, is; 
  
Pr(Xit+1= 1) = φ( β0 + β1 Tit + β2locationi t-1* Ti t-1 + β 3Tit.Eit-1 + β4 ln RLPt-1+ β5Entityt-1+ β6Aget-1 
+ β7Industryt-1 +  β8Locationt-1 + β9Employmentt-1 + β10Structuret-1 +  β11 Employmentt-1.ln RLPt-
1 + β12Locationt-1.ln RLPt-1 +  β13Tt.ln(RLPt-1 + β 14Tt.ln RLPt-1.Locationt-1 ) +  u2     …(10) 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 is that the probability of an SME exiting increases if it has previously been taken 
over, β1>0 (but the takeover effect also depends upon β2,  β3, β13 and β14).  Hypothesis 5 is that 
the chances of exit given the firm has been taken over are higher in peripheral regions; the 
coefficients on the interaction term for peripheral locations are positive (β2>0) and also increases 
with productivity (β14>0). 
 
The empirical specification of post-acquisition productivity performance is:  
 
ln Prodt-1- ln Prodt+n = γ0 + γ1Ti t + γ2Ti t *locationi t-1,+  γ3Ti t * ln RLPit-1   + γ4 Ti t.*Employmenti 
t-1 + γ5Entityt-1 + γ6 Aget-1 + γ7Industryt-1 + γ8Locationt-1 + γ9Employmentt-1 + γ10Structuret-1 + 
γ11 ln RLPit-1  +  u3          ....(11) 
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where Prod is  labour productivity and all other variables are as specified above. Hypothesis 6 is 
unusually flexible in specifying that takeover may either improve or reduce SME post-
acquisition performance. The impact of SME takeover on productivity can be summarised by 
differencing equation 11 by takeover (T); 
 
∆(ln Prodt-1- ln Prodt+n )/∆Tt =  γ1 + γ2 locationi t-1,+  γ3 ln RLPit-1   + γ4 .*Ei t-1   ...(12) 
Hypothesis 8, linking peripheral location to a deterioration in post-acquisition productivity 
growth, is γ2<0 and hypothesis 7, that high productivity targets suffer a decline in productivity, is 
γ3<0.  
 
5. Results 
The bivariate probit parameter estimates of the exit and takeover equations (9 and 10) are given 
in Appendix B. The correlation of the disturbance terms (ρ) in the exit and takeover models is 
statistically significantly different from zero (though small at -0.15), suggesting the 
appropriateness of estimating the equations jointly. The results for the takeover equations are in 
the bottom half of the table. Both the productivity coefficient (α1) and that on squared 
productivity (α10) are significant and positive; the probability of takeover increases with the 
SME’s productivity (unless location effects intervene), in accordance with hypothesis 1. The 
dummies for both intermediate and periphery locations are statistically significant and negative 
(α7<0).  SMEs located outside the ‘core’ (the omitted location), are less likely to be taken over. 
However, peripheral locations appear to have statistically significant positive interactions with 
productivity (α2>0).  
 
Because of the non-linearity and interaction effects in the empirical model, interpretation of the 
coefficients is not always self-evident. Across the entire range of productivity, SMEs in the 
‘core’ are most likely to be taken over, significantly more so than in the other locations. This 
result is consistent with a greater intensity of competition or readier access to finance in the core 
– hypothesis 3.  The intermediate region has the next highest probability, but figure 1 suggests 
that this might be matched or surpassed by SMEs in the periphery at the high end of the 
productivity distribution.  
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Figure 1 Predicted Probability of Takeover by Location and Productivity 
 
Notes: Estimated at the sample averages from equation 9 and Appendix B. 
Hypothesis 2 postulates that SMEs registered as companies will have a greater chance of being 
taken over because they are obliged to provide more information, and this is what the selection 
equation of Appendix B shows. Turning to the role of size in acquisition chances, larger SMEs 
generally have an increased probability of acquisition – also consistent with hypothesis 213. Also 
in line with hypothesis 2 that age is a (positive) function of information on targets, age effects 
generally indicate higher chances of older SMEs being taken over. SMEs between 5 and 19 years 
old are most likely (0.21 percent a year) to be acquired. These results (along with the ‘entity’ 
                                                 
13
 However, at the top of the distribution, the chances of takeover fall and the highest likelihood of acquisition is for 
firms with around 200 employees with a 2.5 percent predicted probability. But even the largest SMEs have a higher 
predicted probability of takeover than micros (businesses with employment of less than 10). 
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parameter) suggest that lack of public information can explain lower takeover chances, offering a 
possible basis for policy recommendations.  
 
Appendix B tabulates the estimated exit equation 10. That takeover stimulates an increased 
chance of an SME exiting is partly reflected in the statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of the takeover variable in the exit equation. However, interpretations of the effect of 
takeover must also include the interactions with location and productivity.  Table 5 shows the 
predicted probability of SMEs exiting by location and takeover. The probabilities are derived 
from the results in Appendix B, using the sample averages except for location, takeover and their 
interactions.  
 
The positive marginal effect of takeover on exit is in harmony with hypothesis 4. At least some 
takeovers enable acquirers to take advantage of synergies with their existing assets. The lower 
marginal effect of takeover for SMEs from more peripheral locations to exit is not consistent 
with hypothesis 5.  
 
Exits are measured just one year after takeover (i.e. 2006) but for the aggregate effect calculated 
below, exits are measured in 2007, consistent with the productivity equation. There is very little 
difference between effects for 2006 and 2007. Exit must be chronologically close to takeover for 
credibly assigning causality; the greater the elapse of time from takeover, the less the likelihood 
of direct causation.  
 
Table 5 - Predicted probabilities and marginal effects of location and takeover on SME 
exit: bivariate probit 
 Exit 
Location 
Predicted probability 
given takeover 
Marginal effect 
of takeover 
Core 30.61% 6.57% 
Intermediate  28.61% 6.06% 
Periphery 26.18% 3.36% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations,  from Appendix B. 
Note. Estimated at the sample average 
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The takeover effect includes the exit element when the coefficients are from the selection model 
(Appendix C for the period 2004 to 2007, where takeovers are identified in 2005). The statistical 
significance of ρ with 99 percent confidence in the selection models is to be expected in the 
presence of sample selection. Appendix C shows productivity is affected by the takeover 
coefficient (γ1) and the interactions of takeover with the (prior) level of RLP (γ3) and employment 
(γ4). The location impact on post-acquisition productivity (γ2) is statistically insignificant; 
periphery location is irrelevant to an SME’s productivity after takeover. 
 
The estimated coefficients and equation 12 suggests that takeovers increase productivity by 38 
percent for the average SME. But this is a little misleading because the takeover analysis 
indicates that more productive and relatively larger SMEs have a higher chance of takeover, both 
of which reduce the effect of takeover on productivity performance. Takeovers increase 
productivity for averaged sized SMEs with prior RLP below 1.9. Hypothesis 7, more productive 
acquired SMEs are more likely to be adversely affected by takeovers and suffer a deterioration of 
performance (γ3<0), as if predatory large firms were ‘intrapreneurship’ hunting, finds support. 
For firms with high relative productivity (greater than 1.9 when taken at the average size), 
takeovers reduce performance. The tipping point beyond which takeover negatively impacts on 
productivity, is lower for larger firms. For example, an SME with employment of 100 has a 
relative productivity tipping point of only 1.36. Above this relative labour productivity, 
takeovers reduce productivity for this size of SME; the acquired firms lose what ultimately made 
them high performers.  
 
Hypothesis 8 is that the takeovers in the periphery are more detrimental to performance than 
those in the core (γ2<0). As the location-takeover interactions are statistically insignificant, no 
location heterogeneity is found in the effect of takeovers upon productivity performance for the 
period 2004 to 2007. Hypothesis 8 must therefore be rejected. 
 
Because of the significance of some of the interaction effects of takeover with the variables, such 
as productivity prior to takeover and size
14
, the coefficients from the above results are used to 
                                                 
14
 The location interactions with takeovers are not statistically significant. 
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graph the effects of takeover on productivity by prior productivity in figure 2. The period 2004 to 
2007 is shown
15
 at the sample average for productivity. Figure 2 shows that the least productive 
SMEs experience the highest productivity increase because of being taken over, and the highest 
productivity firms achieved virtually no improvement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - SME takeover in 2005 impact by prior productivity on productivity 2004-07 
 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations based on Appendix C 
Note. Size taken at the sample average (5.2) 
 
The partial impact of takeovers on regional productivity gaps 
Equation (8), from which the following results are obtained, excludes any productivity impact on 
the acquirers of SMEs. For the periphery this is because they are assumed to be located in the 
core (outside the region), and for the other regions, to provide a comparison with the periphery. 
                                                 
15
 The figures use the estimates from the ML selection model (with robust errors). 
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Because there is proportionately more takeover activity in the core than in the periphery, and 
because on average productivity increases after a takeover in all regions, the core gains more 
from this source than the periphery - in fact an increase in productivity of almost half as much 
again (Table 6).  
 
To reduce the error from the stochastic component of the takeover equation (9), the calculations 
assume each acquired firm had a probability of takeover of 1 and others a probability of zero. 
The direct impact of SME takeovers in 2005 was to raise periphery SME sector productivity 0.3 
percent by 2007 but core SME productivity by 0.42 percent (Table 6). Positive direct takeover 
effects are diminished by the closure of productive acquisitions, in all regions. Almost one fifth 
of the core direct increase in productivity from takeovers is offset by the exit effect - but this 
would be more than counteracted by the unmeasured improvements of the acquiring businesses. 
For the intermediate region, exits after takeover offset more than a third of the direct effect, 
suggesting major industrial restructuring in these regions. The intermediate region also has the 
lowest productivity effect of takeovers of the three regions, perhaps because their distinctive 
industrial structure provided fewest profit opportunities. 
 
Table 6 - Partial Labour Productivity Impact 2004 -2007 of SME Takeovers in 2005  
Location/method 
SME Direct 
Productivity effect 
SME Exit 
effect 
SME 
Total Productivity 
impact 
Periphery 0.30% 0.056% 0.248% 
Intermediate 0.33% 0.121% 0.211% 
Core 0.42% 0.078% 0.341% 
Great Britain 0.36% 0.099% 0.257% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations using biprobit and selection models Appendices B and C parameters 
and equation 8. 
 
The most plausible explanations for the different experiences of core and periphery must be 
related to the wealth, density and productivity of the two areas. Higher density of population and 
business in the core may mean greater competition and/or agglomeration economies triggering 
more takeover activity. The greater wealth could provide more significant profit opportunities or 
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capital - if information flows attenuate with distance - both of which would motivate 
acquisitions.  
 
Table 7 – Partial effect of SME takeovers in 2005 on economy-wide labour productivity 
2004 to 2007 
Location 
SME share of 
private sector 
employment 
Economy wide 
effect on 
productivity 
Periphery  46.9% 0.116% 
Intermediate 44.1% 0.093% 
Core 37.3% 0.127% 
Great Britain 42.5 % 0.109% 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations from Table 6 
 
Although the core is the principal beneficiary of SME takeovers, SMEs account for a smaller 
proportion of (output and) employment there than in the periphery (Table 7). Consequently the 
benefit to the regional economy is proportionately greater in the periphery (not taking into 
account gains to the acquirer). Indeed the contribution to the regional productivity gap is only 
(0.127- 0.116=) 0.011 percent. There is still a contribution, but the regional policy implications 
appear to be that SME takeover market imperfections in the periphery should be reduced in order 
to close the gap, rather than that acquisitions should be discouraged. With more takeover 
activity, productivity in the periphery would be higher. 
 
The intermediate regions experience a smaller boost to the economy from takeovers in 2005 
(0.093 percent) than either the core or periphery (again not taking into account gains to acquirers 
based in this area). This lesser effect is primarily caused by the greater (weighted) takeover-exit 
effect there, perhaps in part due to proximity to the core. Nearness may make external takeovers 
by larger firms based in the core more likely in the intermediate regions if distance reduces 
information flow. If so, there could be a faster rate of moving the acquired assets to the core, at 
least for a few larger SMEs (that matter substantially because the takeover-exit effect is weighted 
by employment).   
 
 
28 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The present exercise has forged a link between the spatial analysis of the New Economic 
Geography and SME industrial policy, deriving an expression for the quantitative impact of 
takeovers on the periphery. An important contribution  is the analysis of a new data set (BSD) of 
nearly all British firms that allows an unprecedentedly detailed study of SMEs in a spatial 
context, with particular attention to the market for SME control. Contrary to the experience of 
large companies (and to Q theory), highly productive SME’s are more likely to be taken over - 
although this effect is weaker if they are located in peripheral regions than in the core. Takeovers 
also increase the chances of an SME closing. The regional bias is the opposite of that originally 
hypothesized; takeovers in the core are more likely than in the periphery.  
 
Takeovers raise productivity after acquisition but by less for the most productive SMEs. This last 
result would be expected if acquiring firms attempted to compensate for a lack of internally 
generated innovation, or management or other assets that they could strip out of the target SMEs. 
It is in line with a resource-based perspective on takeovers and knowledge transfer, where 
closure of the target is necessary to relocate and integrate the newly acquired assets with the 
purchaser. For those businesses that do not exit after takeover, there is no distinctive regional 
effect on post-acquisition productivity; SME targets in the core and periphery perform equally 
well on average after acquisition. 
 
Another finding is that the greater information provision of registered companies markedly 
increases their chances of acquisition. This suggests that the lower propensities to be taken over 
in the periphery are due to poorer information in the core about periphery SMEs. Consistent with 
Baldwin and Forskild’s (2000) NEG model, policies that lower the cost of trading ideas would 
therefore encourage dispersion of economic activity. In the present case a policy of improving 
the information available about SME potential targets in the periphery, as Allinson et al (2007) 
recommend, so that takeover rates there more closely match those in the core, would boost 
productivity. 
 
A feature not captured in the foregoing analysis is to what bought out owners of SMEs turn their 
attention subsequently. If they become serial entrepreneurs they may enhance the supply of high 
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performing, productive small firms. ‘Successful’ exits may provide entrepreneurs with the 
finance for other start-ups. It is not possible to identify whether firms that are sold directly 
trigger a start-up in the same region and the scale of repeat entrepreneurship from takeovers is 
not generally known
16
. But to the extent that serial entrepreneurship is significant, it reinforces 
the beneficial regional impact found for SME takeovers. 
 
The focus of this assessment of the regional impact of SME takeovers has been productivity. If a 
post-takeover productivity increase was achieved primarily by shedding labour, and the workers 
remained without employment in the region, it might be contended that the welfare implications 
of SME takeovers were rather different from that advanced here. In the case of very large firms 
cutting their workforces there could be a likelihood of skill mismatches that might contribute to 
higher structural unemployment. But the concern here is with relatively small individual 
employers. Assuming the level of regional demand does not change it is reasonable to expect 
displaced workers to find other jobs quite promptly; an SME reducing employment is unlikely to 
affect equilibrium unemployment in a region even minutely. At least with this neoclassical 
assumption the effect on regional productivity, defined as output per member of the actual and 
potential labour force, is not doubtful. A more definite shortcoming of the productivity measure 
is that it does not take into account potential or future output and productivity, which may mean 
that some research-orientated SMEs, perhaps generating patents but little or no current revenue, 
are not taken into account in the analysis. 
In another respect also the impact of SME takeovers estimated is a partial one, not taking into 
account the gains to the acquiring firm if it absorbs or closes the acquisition. This approach has 
the advantage of sharpening the overarching hypothesis that the periphery loses out, for it 
assumes that acquiring firms are all located outside the region. Further research on the benefits to 
acquiring firms and their locations is highly desirable to provide more complete estimates of the 
payoffs to takeovers. Ignoring any consequences for the acquiring firm, the effect of SME 
takeovers in 2005 was to raise labour productivity in Great Britain by 0.109 percent over the 
years 2004-7. Perhaps surprisingly this partial impact in the core region, at 0.127 percent, was 
                                                 
16
 But see Stamm, Audretsch, and Meijaard (2008). 
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slightly larger than in the periphery (0.116 percent). The driver of the difference is the much 
greater chances of takeover in the core.  
A qualification to this quantification is that it only refers to one year’s experience. The rate of 
takeovers of publicly quoted firms fluctuates widely from year to year and so the same may be 
expected of SMEs.  The period considered in the present study was one when the stock market 
was rising and large firm finance was cheap. SME takeover activity and effects might therefore 
be expected to be stronger than when the economy is less buoyant.  
 
Regional productivity gaps may be widened by the operation of the SME takeover market more 
than the calculated small core-periphery productivity gain difference. If all or most acquirers are 
located in the core then this will be an unmeasured reason for an increasing differential. But the 
key finding that the core gains more from a process which should be common to the periphery as 
well, and is not dependent on the location of large firm headquarters, carries a lesson about the 
gap.  Rather than regarding takeovers as harmful to periphery regions, policy makers should 
consider ways of improving the operation of this market for SMEs in these places.  
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Appendix A -Appropriate weights for averaging SME’s labour productivity 
The appropriateness of employment weights with labour productivity can be shown below. There 
are two firms each with employment (e) and output (q). 
P = Q/E , where q1+q2 = Q, e1+e2 = E and pi = qi/ei 
Q/E = p1.(e1/(e1+e2)) + p2.(e2/(e1+e2)) = (q1/e1).(e1/(e1+e2)) + (q2/e2).(e2/(e1+e2)) = (q1/(e1+e2)) + 
(q2/(e1+e2)) = (q1+q2)/(e1+e2) 
 
The inappropriateness of output weights can also be shown; 
P = Q/E ≠ (q1/e1).(q1/(q1+q2)) + (q2/e2).(q2/(q1+q2)) = 
(1/q)((q1
2
/e1) + (q2
2
/e2)) 
 
Given that output weights to productivity do not aggregate appropriately, we recommend using 
only employment weights when labour productivity is used. 
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Appendix B – Bivariate probit of exit and takeover 2004-06 (takeover in 2005) 
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect Mean value 
Dependent variable exit   0.2317 
Takeover 0.6727*** 0.2397 0.0066 
Ln(RLP) -0.0533*** -0.0158 -0.53532 
Ln(RLP)^2 0.0051*** 0.0015 1.23034 
Age 2 to 4 0.0417*** 0.0124 0.247852 
Age 5 to 9 -0.1927*** -0.0546 0.224248 
Age 10 to 19 -0.4761*** -0.1265 0.236512 
Age 20+ years -0.6451*** -0.1569 0.158742 
Ln(local unit) -0.1562*** -0.0462 0.022771 
Ln(local unit)^2 0.0495*** 0.0146 0.027224 
Employment -0.0096*** -0.0028 5.18 
Employment^2 0.0001*** 1.5E-05 220.2 
Takeover*employment -0.0012*** -0.0004 0.115591 
Employment*ln(RLP) 0.0005*** 0.0001 -2.6012 
Company -0.1353*** -0.0400 0.51009 
Partnership -0.0771*** -0.0223 0.177961 
Mid-periphery -0.0481*** -0.0142 0.425805 
Periphery -0.0364*** -0.0107 0.246611 
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0049** 0.0014 -0.23745 
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0088*** 0.0026 -0.13971 
Mid-periphery*Takeover  0.0173 0.0051 0.002365 
Periphery*Takeover  -0.0738** -0.0212 0.001296 
Takeover*ln(RLP) -0.0426*** -0.0126 -0.00225 
Takeover*Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0092 0.0027 -0.00049 
Takeover*Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0252 0.0074 -0.00096 
Industry controls Yes  
Predicted probability (exit=1) 0.2194  
Dependent variable takeover  0.0066 
Ln(RLP) 0.0918*** 5.4E-04 -0.5353 
Ln(RLP)^2 0.0198*** 1.2E-04 1.2303 
Ln(local unit) -0.1478*** -8.7E-04 0.0228 
Employment 0.0424*** 0.00025 5.1787 
Employment^2 -0.0007*** -3.92E-06 220.2 
Employment^3 3.96E-06*** 2.34E-08 27284.8 
Employment^4 -7.84E-09*** -4.63E-11 4.5E+06 
Age 2 to 4 0.1109*** 7.1E-04 0.2479 
Age 5 to 9 0.1647*** 1.1E-03 0.2242 
Age 10 to 19 0.1674*** 1.1E-03 0.2365 
20+ years 0.1184*** 7.9E-04 0.1587 
Company 0.9655*** 0.007218 0.5101 
Partnership -0.0689** -3.83E-04 0.1780 
Mid-periphery -0.0877*** -5.10E-04 0.4258 
Periphery -0.1035*** -5.69E-04 0.2466 
Mid-periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0025 1.49E-05 -0.2375 
Periphery*ln(RLP) 0.0193** 1.14E-04 -0.1397 
Industry controls Yes  
Predicted probability (takeover=1) 0.0019  
N 1,897,288  
 -0.1514***  
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Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Note. constants not reported. Marginal effects estimated at sample 
average. 
Source: ONS, authors’ calculations 
 
40 
 
Appendix C Table – DiD productivity (2004-2007) regressions 
Regression model 
OLS with 
(robust SE) 
ML selection 
model (robust SE) 
Dependent variable LnLP07-lnLP04 
Takeover05 0.120*** 0.218*** 
Ln(RLP)04 -0.284*** -0.320*** 
Ln(local unit)04 -0.063*** -0.093*** 
Employment04 0.004*** 0.003*** 
Takeover05* Employment04 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Age 2 to 4 0.184*** 0.174*** 
Age 5 to 9 0.150*** 0.037*** 
Age 10 to 19 0.104*** -0.103*** 
Age 20+ years 0.069*** -0.188*** 
Company04 0.058*** 0.077*** 
Partnership04 -0.013*** -0.023*** 
Mid-periphery04 -0.017*** -0.041*** 
Periphery04 -0.009*** -0.030*** 
Mid-periphery*Takeover05 -0.025 -0.027 
Periphery*Takeover05 -0.012 -0.043 
Takeover05*ln(RLP) -0.103*** -0.103*** 
Industry controls Yes Yes 
N 1,327,404 1,327,404 
R
2
  0.11  
Selection equation Survive 2004-07 
Age 2 to 4  -0.051*** 
Age 5 to 9  0.143*** 
Age 10 to 19  0.377*** 
Age 20+ years  0.508*** 
Takeover05  -0.219*** 
Employment04  0.014*** 
Employment04^2  -7.27E-05*** 
Takeover05*Employment04  -2.58E-04 
Ln(local unit)04^2  -0.048*** 
Ln(local unit)04  0.109*** 
Ln(RLP)04  0.081*** 
Ln(RLP)04^2  0.032*** 
Ln(RLP)* Employment04  -0.001*** 
Mid-periphery04  0.041*** 
Periphery04  0.020*** 
Mid-periphery*Takeover05  -0.017 
Periphery*Takeover05  0.067** 
Takeover05*Ln(RLP)  0.008 
Mid-periphery*Ln(RLP)  0.013*** 
Periphery*Ln(RLP)  0.013*** 
Industry controls  Yes 
N  1,897,288 
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  -0.765*** 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note. Constants not reported. Number of observation in productivity equation  
reduced by exits over the period. 
Source: ONS, authors’  calculations 
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